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Case presentations
Patient 1. A 69-year-old woman was readmitted to the New
England Medical Center Hospital (NEMCH) for evaluation of
progressive dementia. Twelve years previously, she had been
admitted to another hospital because of acute pyelonephritis.
Laboratory findings disclosed the following: hematocrit 23%;
serum creatinine 7.1 mg/dl; and serum sodium 143 mEq, potas-
sium 4.3 mEq, chloride 115 mEq, and carbon dioxide content, 11
mEq per liter. Intravenous pyelography suggested chronic pyelo-
nephritis. The patient then was transferred to the NEMCH for
further care. Analgesic-abuse nephropathy was diagnosed partly
because she had consumed approximately 6 kg phenacetin over
the previous 20 years for headaches.
During the next several years, her renal function deteriorated
progressively despite conservative therapy. She was treated for
urinary tract infections on numerous occasions. Five years ago
the BUN was 61 mg/dl and the serum creatinine was 14.0 mg/dl.
A subtotal parathyroidectomy was performed because of persis-
tent hypercalcemia. She recovered from this procedure unevent-
fully. Three years ago, the patient developed a pericardial
effusion, atrial fibrillation, and congestive heart failure, and
chronic hemodialysis was initiated. Her dialysis history was
complicated by mild congestive heart failure and an episode of
hepatitis, but overall the patient functioned reasonably well.
During the last month prior to this NEMCH admission, the
patient's family and the dialysis staff noted that she had impair-
ment of recent memory and difficulty with calculations.
On admission, neurologic examination was remarkable for
finger agnosia, right-left confusion, acalculia, and mild cogwheel
rigidity of the arms. Tests of blood and urine for various drugs
and heavy metals were negative. The cerebrospinal fluid was
unremarkable. A CT scan of the head revealed no masses or shift
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in midline structures. A radionuclide brain scan was normal. An
electroencephalogram showed marked generalized slowing with
occasional sharp waves. During the next four weeks, the pa-
tient's neurologic status waxed and waned, with periods of
extreme agitation alternating with periods of unresponsiveness.
Stuttering was noted for the first time a few weeks after
admission. On the basis of the neurologic findings, progressive
"dialysis dementia" was diagnosed. Despite brief improvement
with diazepam, the patient became progressively more disorient-
ed, was unable to feed herself, developed urinary and fecal
incontinence and, during the sixth week of her hospital course,
finally lapsed into coma. Discussions were initiated with the
patient's family and legal guardian about the possibility of
discontinuing dialysis.
Patient 2. A 50-year-old woman was admitted to the NEMCH
for treatment of depression. Diabetes mellitus, discovered 26
years previously, was controlled initially with oral hypoglycemic
agents and later with insulin. Four years ago, proteinuria and
renal insufficiency were first noted. The BUN was 36 mg/dl and
the serum creatinine was 1.4 mgldl. Three years ago, the patient
was hospitalized with severe diarrhea secondary to diabetic
enteropathy. Ophthalmic examination revealed proliferative dia-
betic retinopathy and glaucoma. A peripheral sensory neuro-
pathy also was noted. The patient was hospitalized with hyper-
tension, congestive heart failure, and unstable angina pectoris
eight months later. At that time, a 24-hour urine specimen
contained 2.5 grams of protein, the BUN was 64 mg/dl, and the
serum creatinine was 3.3 mg/dl. A diagnosis of diabetic nephro-
pathy was made.
During the subsequent year, her renal function deteriorated
rapidly and she developed uremia. Chronic hemodialysis was
begun but was tolerated poorly: the patient frequently exper-
ienced angina pectoris during dialysis. Despite laser therapy, her
diabetic retinopathy progressed and she became legally blind.
Her vision loss produced increasing depression and the patient
developed anorexia and insomnia. Previously an active home-
maker, she became bedridden and blamed this on weakness in
her legs, but repeated neurologic examinations failed to reveal
muscle weakness. She frequently spoke of discontinuing dialy-
sis, although she was thought not to be suicidal. The patient lives
at home with her husband and a teenage daughter, and her sister
takes responsibility for providing her transportation to and from
dialysis.
On admission, the blood pressure was 140/90 mm Hg; there
was a grade 111W systolic ejection murmur at the left sternal
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border, an S4 gallop, and basilar rales. She had bilateral cata-
racts, and a limited funduscopic examination revealed scattered
microaneurysms and dot hemorrhages. The neurologic examina-
tion was remarkable for decreased vibratory, position, and
pinprick sensation in the hands and feet. Current treatment
includes antidepressant medication and occupational and phys-
ical therapy.
Discussion
DR. RENÉE C. Fox (Annenberg Professor of the
Social Sciences, Department of Sociology, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania):
This discussion could be titled "Chronic Dialysis in
the 1980s." I mean this in more than a temporal
sense because these patients represent some of the
most troubling aspects of dialysis in this decade:
problems that are social, ethical, biomedical, and
technological. These problems are as much a conse-
quence of the medical and social progress that has
been made in the development of dialysis over the
past three to four decades, as of the difficulties and
impasses that have been encountered. Before dis-
cussing these particular patients, I would like to
provide the social and historic context in which to
place them. I will identify the chief phases through
which hemodialysis has passed since its inception
and some of the salient features that have character-
ized the decades of the '50s, '60s and '70s.
As everyone here knows, Dr. Willem J. Kolif, a
Dutch physician, invented and first used the origi-
nal artificial kidney machine, a rotating drum mod-
el, at the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the
l940s. But not until the end of World War II and the
advent of the 1950s were clinical trials initiated with
Kolif-type machines in a limited number of medical
centers in the United States, Canada, and Great
Britain. Thus the l950s launched the era of hemo-
dialysis. At the outset, the kidney machine was an
apparatus about four feet long, with approximately
125 feet of cellophane tubing, that resembled a
"miniature tank car, an iron lung, or a giant wash-
ing machine" [11. It loomed over the medical team
physically and emotionally. "The kidney machine
is turning into a Frankenstein monster. . . in danger
of destroying itself and all of us in the process!"
exclaimed one physician of this era till. In the
collective privacy of their conference rooms, mem-
bers of the metabolic and renal groups regularly
would ask, "How long can we go on doing this?"
The possibility of calling a moratorium on dialysis
was ever present.
The ethnographic study that I conducted, in 1951
to 1954, of the community comprising the patients
and research physicians of a clinical research ward
where dialysis was pioneered [2] chronicled what
Dr. Francis D. Moore termed the "black years" of
clinical investigation [3]. It was a period when
research physicians tried a new, extraordinary pro-
cedure on very sick, often terminally ill patients,
whose conditions could not be helped by estab-
lished treatments; when patients and the medical
professionals caring for them and experimenting on
them proceeded in the face of much that was
unknown, high uncertainty, risk, and danger; and
when, as a consequence of these circumstances, the
mortality rate of the patients was exceptionally
high. It need hardly be said that, in many respects,
these were stressful, often tragic times for patients,
their families, and medical professionals.
It should not be supposed, however, that this
period was unequivocally tense and dolorous. The
development of dialysis in the l950s occurred at a
time in the United States when we had much
national enthusiasm about medical research, public
and professional expectancy about its promise and
fruits, and substantial financial support for research
from both government and private sources. Physi-
cians and other medical professionals working with
the artificial kidney were not only buttressed by this
general atmosphere; they also had the uplifting
sense that the field of renal physiology and renal
disease was one of the most exciting and important
medical areas in which one could work. There was
much optimistic and exhilarating speculation about
"breakthroughs" in the fundamental understanding
of normal and abnormal renal function.
The 1950s were dramatic times for the men and
women engaged in hemodialysis. Physicians, and
only physicians, conducted dialysis in those days
aided by specially trained nurses. A cut-down had
to be made each time; a dialysis run took many
more hours than it does today; and the procedure
was a bloody as well as a watery affair. Indeed,
dialysis resembled a major, trail-blazing operation,
carried out by a superstar surgical team.
The invention of the cannula shunt by Quinton
and Scribner in 1960 ushered in the era of intermit-
tent, long-term hemodialysis for patients with se-
vere renal failure who were in the "end-stage" of
their disease. Home dialysis was inaugurated in
1963. Progress also was made with peritoneal dialy-
sis, both on a long-term and a home-treatment
basis. These developments occurred simultaneous-
ly with notable advances in kidney transplantation
that were based on improvements in tissue match-
ing, immunosuppressive therapy, organ preserva-
tion and banking, and surgical technique. Dialysis
became a necessary and vital partner in transplant-
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ing kidneys, maintaining patients awaiting a live or
cadaveric transplant, and sustaining those who had
rejected the organ they had received. Despite the
interrelationships between dialysis and transplanta-
tion, however, certain medical centers showed such
a consistently strong preference for one of these
forms of therapy that a "pro-dialysis" or a "pro-
transplantation" ethos seemed to exist.
Were it not for the invention of the shunt, of
course, and the development of chronic hemodialy-
sis, the patients we are considering today would not
have survived as long as they have. In the 1950s
relatively few patients were dialyzed; the procedure
was experimental; the number of machines was
small; and few persons had the technical compe-
tence required to operate the dialysis machines. In
the 1950s such patients could have been dialyzed
only a few times and would have received a new
cut-down for each run; after a temporary respite,
they would have rapidly died of uremia.
Progress made in the bioengineering aspects of
dialysis in the 1960s helped resolve some of the
most acute technical and clinical problems that
prevailed previously. Partly as a result of these
advances, however, and partly as a consequence of
broader societal developments, dialysis became en-
meshed in a complex set of social, economic,
political, and ethical issues: the allocation of scarce
material and nonmaterial resources; the selection,
"nonselection," and "deselection" of patients for
treatment; and "quality of life," "right to death,"
and "death with dignity" questions, among others.
Many of these issues converged and acquired a
significance beyond their strict medical importance.
So-called "psychological and social suitability" and
"social worth" criteria were among those being
used to decide which persons would be accepted for
dialysis. Selection committees headed by physi-
cians, but composed both of medical professionals
and lay persons, were making such gate-keeping
choices. The news media spotlighted this process as
a violation of basic American values of distributive
justice and equity. A good example was the story
about the selection committee at the Northwest
Kidney Center in Seattle, written by Shana Alex-
ander, and published in L(fe magazine [4]. Such
stories were fostered by some physicians who,
although key actors in the selection process,
thought the process was socially and morally
wrong, and believed that the matter ought to be
brought before the public. The scarcity/selection/al-
location and justice/equity questions associated
with dialysis overlapped and fused with issues in
the 1960s concerning our involvement in the war in
Southeast Asia:
If we really believe in health and life rather
than death and destruction. . . then why have
we been willing to invest seemingly limitless
funds in a war in Vietnam, and unwilling to
designate comparable funds for treating cata-
strophic kidney disease—providing kidney ma-
chines and dialysis treatment for all who need
them? [1]
Dialysis also came to be regarded as an important
symbolic representation of the kinds of moral and
metaphysical problems associated with health, ill-
ness, and medicine that surfaced as "collective
conscience" concerns in American society in the
1960s. These problems became the foci of "bioeth-
ics," an area of inquiry and action that emerged
around 1965. The life-and-death issues that dialysis
raised during this period were central topics of
bioethical discussion. Foremost among these were
some of the problems that pertain to the patients
under discussion today: Once a patient begins a life-
sustaining treatment such as dialysis, is it ever
permissible, acceptable, or even desirable to dis-
continue it? If so, who has the right to make this
decision? And who decides who decides? In the
1960s, these questions were usually raised explicitly
or implicitly by patients who requested that their
dialysis be stopped, or who engaged in life-threaten-
ing acts, such as ripping out their cannula-shunts,
missing dialysis sessions, and going on dietary and
drinking "binges." Dialysis teams considered these
incidents among the most difficult dilemmas they
faced.
There is little need to chronicle for you the
history of dialysis in the 1970s. You have just
experienced that decade and are still faced in the
1980s with some of the problems inherited from it. I
think you would agree that the '70s have been more
notable for the social, economic, political, legal,
and moral problems of dialysis than for the new
biomedical and technologic developments.
It is true that arteriovenous fistulas and bovine
and Dacron® grafts largely have replaced the can-
nula shunt and have helped with certain access
problems. The artificial kidney itself has been modi-
fied: it is smaller and more elegant in appearance; it
is more transistorized and has more programmed,
fail-safe features; and it is more powerful and
efficient, thereby reducing the amount of time that
patients must spend on dialysis. Work on a portable
"suitcase kidney" has continued, as have efforts to
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design a wearable artificial kidney. An ambulatory
form of peritoneal dialysis has become a viable
option. During the 1970s, progress also occurred in
the management of medical problems associated
with dialysis and with the underlying diseases or
disorders from which patients on dialysis suffer,
such as anemia, malnutrition, bone disease, and
peripheral nerve disorders. In fact, one of the major
medical developments of the 1970s was that, for the
first time, dialysis teams began to treat a large
number of patients who were afflicted not only with
end-stage renal disease, but with other serious,
chronic conditions as well. Partly by choice and
partly by necessity, the medical profession im-
proved its capacity to dialyze patients who had
complicated, multiple disorders. The number al-
though not the proportion of patients on home
dialysis increased in the 1970s. Dialysis became
more of a helpmate and less of a rival of renal
transplantation as transplant teams modulated their
efforts to "save the organ" from rejection by reduc-
ing the high doses of immunosuppressive drugs they
previously had given patients.
These forms of progress notwithstanding, major,
recurrent problems of access with fistulas and grafts
still exist. The basic principles on which the artifi-
cial kidney machine is built and operates are much
the same as they were in the 1950s. The process of
dialysis itself continues to create troublesome and,
not infrequently, menacing side effects. Biomedical
understanding of the mechanisms involved in kid-
ney disease, its cause, prevention, and therapy, has
advanced relatively slowly in recent years. What is
more, the expectant language of the 1 950s, herald-
ing imminent "breakthroughs" in such understand-
ing, has all but vanished from the medical literature
and from presentations at nephrology meetings.
From a medical point of view, dialysis arrived at
a curious stage in the 1970s. It had more than come
of age: it was almost 40 years old. It had undergone
many technical improvements. It was considered
sufficiently routinized, teachable, and safe, so that
the process of dialyzing not only had been delegated
to nurses and technicians, but also to patients,
members of their families, and to unrelated lay
people trained and paid to be dialysis aides. Yet one
could hardly say that dialysis had become a stan-
dard, conventional treatment. Despite the self-help
ideology and reality of home dialysis, managing the
disordered metabolic state skillfully in ways that
dynamically respond to variations in the patient's
disease continues to require a great deal of profes-
sional supervision. Furthermore, chronic dialysis
still is used only as a last resort to treat patients who
are in the final, irreversible phase of incurable renal
disease.
The passage of Public Law 92-603 in 1972 brought
about "the democratization of dialysis" [5]. Under
the provisions of this law, an extension of the Social
Security Act, most of the treatment costs for dialy-
sis and renal transplantation are paid by Federal
government funds. In effect, the law established
national health insurance solely and exclusively for
persons with end-stage renal disease. This single
nonmedical event significantly expanded the dialy-
sis population. Were it not for passage of Public
Law 92-603, it is quite probable that neither of
today's patients would have been considered medi-
cally eligible for dialysis, nor would they have been
started on this course of treatment. In the l960s,
age, physical condition, and/or mental status would
likely have disqualified them.
The passage of Public Law 92-603 grew out of the
series of events in the medical and social history of
dialysis that I have highlighted. Perhaps the most
significant of these was the fact that in the 1960s,
the triad of chronic kidney disease, dialysis, and
renal transplantation not only became linked in the
public's mind with the question, "What is wrong
with the distribution and delivery of medical care in
our society?", but also came to be viewed as
emblematic of what might be wrong with American
society in a broader and deeper moral sense.
Enactment of the law received a great deal of
impetus from the strenuous lobbying activities of
two voluntary health associations, the National
Kidney Foundation, and the National Association
of Patients on Hemodialysis and Transplantation
(NAPI-IT). The history and sociology of these asso-
ciations, and the story of the role that they played in
the decision to Federally fund the treatment costs of
dialysis and renal transplantation, would make a
fascinating and important study itself. Here, I only
want to mention that although the lobbying efforts
of the National Kidney Foundation and NAPHT
were in the best American populist and political
tradition, and were highly effective besides, they
also raised questions about a disease-by-disease
approach to whatever type of national health insur-
ance might eventually be instituted in the United
States, and about the role of special interest groups
and tactics in this connection.
As designed, Public Law 92-603 made dialysis
and kidney transplantation accessible to a much
larger number of persons and to individuals of more
diverse ages, disease states, and social back-
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grounds. From the data at hand, I cannot tell what
the social origins of the two patients presented here
today are; their occupations, economic status, lev-
els of education, ethnic, regional, and religious
affiliations remain unknown. But one of the patients
is a woman in her sixties, whom most would have
considered overage for dialysis before the law was
passed; and both of the patients are sicker than
were most patients accepted for dialysis in the pre-
1972 era.
But the law also produced phenomena that were
not fully anticipated or intended by those who
worked for it, drafted it, and welcomed it. To begin
with, financial coverage for dialysis and transplan-
tation has ended up costing much more than was
originally estimated. It now involves the outlay of
close to one billion dollars a year, and the figure is
expected to continue to rise for the next several
years. Second, the medical state of many of the
patients now on dialysis, their social condition, and
their psychologic outlook are confronting dialysis
teams with new, largely unexpected problems. Al-
though some medical groups vociferously claim, for
example, that their dialysis patients with advanced
diabetes are doing well, many more centers report
difficulty in dialyzing patients who have two or
more serious chronic diseases. Some teams go fur-
ther: they admit that they are not sure whether they
are helping these patients or increasing their suffering,
question whether they ought to have started dialyzing
such persons in the first place, and agonize over
whether they ought to continue to do so.
Dialysis teams are also encountering sociologic
difficulties that they are more reluctant to make
known: problems that arise from the very "demo-
cratization" of eligibility for dialysis and access to
it. Team members are rediscovering a sociologic
truism: that the social background of patients as
well as their psychologic and medical status signifi-
cantly affect these patients' attitudes toward dialy-
sis and their response to the therapy. Because
dialysis nurses have more continuous, first-hand
contact with dialysis patients and their families,
they are more likely than physicians to be aware of
and disturbed by the sociologic problems. When
they observe that many patients from deprived
socioeconomic backgrounds, certain minority
groups, or troubled family situations do not respond
as well to dialysis as do patients from more privi-
leged, stable, and "establishment" milicux, the
nurses are not only concerned, but are likely to feel
guilty—to feel responsible for the inequitable re-
sults. In one university hospital,
• . the dialysis nurses have gone through a
rocky time of blaming themselves for harboring
unconscious prejudice against poor black pa-
tients from the inner city, and for their inability
to communicate effectively with such patients.
They attribute the relatively poor response of
patients from this background to dialysis to
their [the nurses'I personal limitations and fail-
ings rather than to more "objective" medical,
psychological, and social factors [1].
The passage of Public Law 92-603 has produced
at least one other unexpected result. Now that all
the "social worth" criteria of the 1960s have been
eliminated, medical professionals find themselves
dialyzing some patients whom they otherwise
would choose not to treat. These can include people
whose lifestyles are not only harmful to the manage-
ment of their disease and their treatment, but also
can include individuals whose behavior is deviant
or even criminal. For example, in one dialysis
program with which I have some familiarity, nurses
have a hard time justifying to themselves the excel-
lent care that they give to a patient who sells illicit
drugs and to another who is a participant in an
illegal numbers racket. In principle and in fact the
medical profession is always called upon to deal
with the health, illness, and injuries of all kinds of
persons, independently of the origins, character,
values, beliefs, and behavior of these people. But,
in contrast to other forms of medical care, dialysis
entails a meeting of the patient and the dialysis
partner two or three times a week, for sessions that
last from 4 to 6 hours, in a treatment sequence that
can, and usually does, continue for years, and that
ends only with the death of the patient or with a
kidney transplant. These circumstances increase
the strains that dialysis teams experience in the face
of their universal obligations to patients. Once
again, since the nurses are continually on the "front
lines" of dialysis therapy, it is they who generally
feel these stresses most keenly.
Perhaps the most ironic aspect of the law is how it
symbolized, first in the 1960s and then in the 1970s,
two diametrically opposed problems with our health
care system. In the 1960s the big question about
dialysis was, "Why are we not providing abundant
resources for this life sustaining treatment?". In the
1970s, the major question was, "Why are we?".
Why have kidney disease, dialysis, and renal trans-
plantation been favored in this singular way? Why
was a catastrophic disease, rather than a more
commonplace, curable illness given special atten-
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tion? Why were extraordinary, rather than ordinary
therapies developed? Why did therapeutic, rather
than preventive, medicine prosper? And why did
the Federal government support research for
health, illness, and medicine, rather than other
important and valued activities, needs, and con-
cerns? Questions about the allocation of scarce
resources were asked in the 1970s because those
years were a time of social and cultural soul-
searching as well as a time of national economic
troubles, some of which have carried over into the
1980s.
I consider the central issue of this Forum, and the
primary sociomedical issue of chronic dialysis in
the 1980s, to be what Belding Scribner has called
the problem of "negative selection." What seems
to have happened, largely as a result of Public Law
92-603, is that virtually no one with end-stage renal
disease is being excluded from chronic dialysis,
regardless of what contraindications might exist.
For example, elderly, as well as middle-aged and
young persons now receive this treatment. Patients
on dialysis are not only ill with end-stage renal
disease, but they also can have diabetes, cardiovas-
cular disease, cancer, senile dementia, or another
serious medical condition that not only might ren-
der the patient unresponsive to dialysis, but might
complicate dialysis in ways that subject the patient
to added suffering. It is as though physicians have
suspended all biomedical, as well as psychologic
and social criteria of judgment concerning who
should be dialyzed and who not; perhaps they
believe they have no right to make decisions of this
sort.
Nevertheless, dialysis teams now seem to be
more concerned than ever with the problem of "de-
selecting" patients for this treatment, either
through the decision not to start a patient on
dialysis in the first place, or to discontinue the
therapy after it has been initiated. Although the
medical literature contains little mention of this
problem, conferences such as this convening ne-
phrologists and dialysis nurses often focus on a
particular set of social questions for the dialysis
team: Should we be dialyzing these persons? Can
we and should we discontinue their dialysis? Under
what circumstances and how should such decisions
be made? Who has the right to decide? The issue is
far from a simple one, medically or morally.
More significant and subtle than the financial cost
of dialysis is the degree to which physicians' deci-
sions about starting, continuing, and stopping this
therapy are being influenced by political and eco-
nomic factors. For example, the passage of Public
Law 92-603 and the monies it has made available
have potentially profound influences on the clinical
judgment of physicians and could color decisions
about when and whether to dialyze patients. The
fact that the law has contributed to the development
of proprietary dialysis centers, with which some
physicians are associated as investors, as well as
medical staff, enters the picture too. External influ-
ences have made decision-making in questions re-
garding dialysis a complex medical, economic, and
ethical phenomenon, and I will not attempt to
analyze this complexity here. Moreover, in the
period since the enactment of the law, physicians,
patients, and patients' families have increasingly
turned to the courts, seeking opinions and judg-
ments concerning issues such as starting and stop-
ping life-support procedures including dialysis. In
effect, these doctors are seeking the courts' expert
and binding legal counsel on what is right and
wrong.
Is the evolution of dialysis paradigmatic in these
political and economic respects? If we do eventual-
ly develop an American variant of a national health
insurance system, is one of its unplanned and
unintended consequences likely to be that medical
decisions about the whole spectrum of diseases and
therapies covered by the legislated insurance, and
about a wide range of issues associated with them,
likely will be influenced by economic, political, and
legal factors in the various ways that dialysis cur-
rently is? If so, what implications might this have
for the kind and quality of medical care delivered;
for the welfare, rights, and responsibilities of pa-
tients and their families; for the responsibilities and
rights of the medical profession; and for certain
societal values and the processes by which we
deliberate on and implement them?
Over the last 15 years in our society, difficult
questions of medical ethics have moved from pri-
vate and medical professional spheres into the
public domain; these queries have come to be
defined as collective concerns, rather than as purely
individual matters. Many court cases that have
occurred or are pending have become collective
representations of fundamental questions of value
and belief with which American society is currently
grappling, and for which health, illness, and medi-
cine are now "primary symbolic media" [1, 6].
These include the case of Mr. Earle Spring with its
questions relating to end-stage renal disease, dialy-
sis, and transplantation; the cases of Joseph
Saikewicz and of Chad Green and his parents,
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involving issues associated with the problems of
leukemia and its treatment; and the case of Karen
Ann Quinlan, which examines the role of the inten-
sive care unit and life-support systems as well as the
concept of "brain death."
How do we deal with questions of this order in a
society like ours: an advanced, modern society
characterized by highly developed science and
technology, with its benefits and the problems it
generates; secularized, but deeply respectful of and
concerned with moral and religious matters; plural-
istic; populist; a society "under law, rather than
under men"? In such a society, the courts do not
constitute only chambers of adjudication, but also a
moral grid. They are presumed to be nonprejudiced,
nonpartisan, and also nontheocratic arenas where,
on a case-by-case basis, issues that are proximally
or ultimately related to fundamental principles of
our cultural tradition are presented and decided
upon in the light of those principles. In turn, these
decisions dynamically contribute to those princi-
ples. Whether we agree with particular rulings of
the courts, these decisions are morally as well as
legally binding, individually and collectively, until
and unless they are overturned.
Because dialysis issues have been brought before
the courts, special conceptual difficulties for physi-
cians and jurists have arisen independently and in
relationship to each other. The first of these has to
do with who Earle Spring, Joseph Saikewicz, Chad
Green, and Karen Ann Quinlan are in the context of
the courts, and how their legal and medical identi-
ties differ. It is true that in the courts they are
recognized as particular and unique persons, each
of whom is entitled to certain rights and choices and
to be treated in certain ways. At the same time,
however, each of these persons is also legally
representative of a class of individuals. For exam-
ple, Earle Spring represents all persons undergoing
dialysis and perhaps patients on other life-support
systems as well. Therefore, the court's ruling about
whether Earle Spring's dialysis should be discontin-
ued, and about who should make this "substituted
judgment" for him, sets a precedent for other
persons in similar situations.
Physicians, like lawyers, are trained to think,
work, and decide on the basis of individual patients;
they, too, develop professional expertise and wis-
dom, through experience with "cases." Unlike a
lawyer, however, when a physician makes a deci-
sion concerning a patient, the decision relates only
to that patient, not to a group as well. Neither the
physician in question nor other physicians are corn-
pelled to deal with all comparable patients in the
same manner because of the way that Mr. Spring's
case was handled medically. These differences in
medical and legal logic and precedent can be
sources of tension and misunderstanding among
physicians and jurists.
The second conceptual problem is more far-
reaching than the first. Many of the biomedical and
bioethical issues now coming before the courts raise
questions that, in their language, they are "without
competence" to handle or that are "not justicia-
ble." Often, these questions are as metaphysical as
they are biomedical or philosophic: What is life?
What is a person? What is death? When do life and
death begin, and when do they end? Is it better not
to have been born at all than to have been born with
certain defects? Is there such a thing as the "wrong-
ful conception of life," or "wrongful life"? How
vigorously, and in what ways should we intervene
in the human condition to help bring life into being,
to modify its forms, to sustain it, and to speed it to
its termination? These are questions that the courts
must either exclude from their jurisdiction, or else
transform, by redefining them, so that they can be
addressed within a much narrower, specifically
legal framework.
The courts are dealing with these questions in a
step-by-step, case-by-case way that has long-range
implications. As the courts themselves recognize,
there is a real problem about how our society can
most appropriately and effectively handle issues of
this sort. One even might ask whether the appropri-
ate institutional mechanisms exist for confronting
these issues at all. Nevertheless, these issues re-
peatedly find their way into our courts, and they
often move from lower to higher courts in the
system. Called upon to deal with such issues, the
courts usually recast them in the manner I have
indicated. Because of the microdynamic nature of
the legal process, we can easily be misled into
supposing that this process is not really dealing with
any "big" questions. But, by the same token, it is
hard for us to keep track of the process and to see
clearly where it is carrying us.
From this point of view, it will not only be
interesting, but also important to follow the evolu-
tion of the Spring case. For in addition to some of
the more classic dialysis issues that we have re-
viewed in this discussion, the Spring case has raised
questions such as: What do we mean by "mental
competence" and "mental incompetence"? What
is the relationship of mental competence to person-
hood, humanness, and human life—its quality, full-
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ness, meaning, and worth? Given the state of cur-
rent medical technology, I am not at all surprised
that these questions have arisen. But I had predict-
ed that they would arise from the new criteria for
discerning whether "brain death" has occurred and
that the first legal issues would focus on problems
associated with mental retardation. It never oc-
curred to me that dialysis, which for almost 40 years
has been at the dynamic center of some of the most
significant social, ethical, and existential questions
arising in our medical system and our society,
would also be a crucible for deciding these issues.
Questions and answers
DR. JUDITH SWAZEY (Executive Director, Medi-
cine in the Public Interest, Boston, Mass.): I would
like to underscore one of Dr. Fox's initial com-
ments because they deal with an issue that has
concerned us both since Public Law 92-603 was
instituted. The selection of patients for dialysis
since this law went into effect in 1973 has been an
example of the economic determinism of clinical
judgment. By clinical judgment we include the use
of both biomedical criteria and medical-moral val-
ues. With few exceptions, there is a sense among
physicians and other dialysis staff that they must
treat all patients who have end-stage renal failure
because costs are being borne by the Federal gov-
ernment.
An additional element in decision-making has
been the growing role of the courts in defining
criteria and procedures for withholding or with-
drawing treatment from critically or terminally ill
patients. Some of these cases have been decided by
the judiciary because physicians have wanted the
legality of their actions clarified. Further, no matter
how much medical professionals and others dis-
agree with certain substantive or procedural ele-
ments of the court's ruling in cases like that involv-
ing Mr. Saikewicz, they must recognize that treat-
ment decisions, once made by the courts, are not
likely to escape judicial scrutiny in the future, nor
are such decisions likely to revert to more private
forms of deliberation.
Neither economic dictates nor the law should
necessarily be equated with ethics. To the extent
that economic forces and legal authorities deter-
mine the course of clinical decisions, those involved
in administering dialysis will have to deal more and
more with the types of problems discussed today.
Dr. Fox has observed that we have created a new
link in decision-making: in medicine, as in many
other areas, we seem to be shifting from private and
individual modes of reaching decisions to public
and collective ones. In so doing, we in medicine
seem to have catapulted from decisions made with-
in the confines of the family and medical group to
decisions made by legislatures, regulatory agencies,
and courts. In dialysis, for example, an intermedi-
ate arena of dialogue is absent between the private
informal and the collective formal modes. Many of
us are increasingly uncomfortable with a strictly
"implicit" mode of decision-making, but we need
to establish an intermediate method of dealing with
these enormously complex and difficult issues.
Their resolution by legislative, regulatory, or legal
fiats is not appropriate.
DR. LEROY SHEAR (Baystate Medical Center,
Springfield, Mass.): Dr. Fox, it is interesting that
you view the Spring case as part of a collective
phenomenon. I understand you when you say that
the courts are trying to set up collective criteria to
determine whether people should be dialyzed, but I
believe the problem with Mr. Spring is exactly the
opposite, that is, individual rather than collective.
The legal problem with Mr. Spring was deciding
what course he individually would have chosen and
then substituting someone else's judgment for his
own. The major issue before the court was whether
the family or the judge was best suited to make a
substituted judgment for Earle Spring, who was
considered mentally incompetent. The court was
trying to make an extremely difficult individual
decision about what Mr. Spring would have chosen
if he had been capable of expressing his choice. The
court took that responsibility instead of allowing the
family to do so.
DR. Fox: I think I am using the word "collec-
tive" in a somewhat different sense than you are,
Dr. Shear. As a sociologist, I define collective
phenomena as precisely some of those issues asso-
ciated with the case of Mr. Spring. These include:
(1) the widespread public and mass media interest in
Mr. Spring, his case, and the issues concerning
dialysis, chronic illness, old age, senile dementia,
and the rights to life, treatment, discontinuation of
treatment, and death with dignity; (2) the social
facts that the case is being deliberated in the courts
and that the judge had difficulty in making a clear
and firm decision; (3) the distress shared by Dr.
Shear's other patients at the center where Mr.
Spring was a patient, along with the distress exper-
ienced by the nurses and Dr. Shear himself; and (4)
even the concept of "substituted judgment,"
which, though geared to determining what Mr.
Spring would have chosen if he had been capable of
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making and expressing his choice, is collective. In
this sense substituted judgment is a legal principle
grounded in our society's value system and notions
of individualism and autonomy, and it applies to all
members of this society.
DR. SHEAR: Let me be more direct. I believe that
the court's remarkable mismanagement of this
case—the delays, the cost, and the suffering felt by
all persons involved—proves beyond a doubt that
these issues cannot be decided through the legal
system ts it now exists. The judiciary cannot handle
the problems quickly enough, and the lawyers and
judges must rely on doctors to make the judgments
anyway. Lawyers and judges do not know what
information to review, how to get the data, or how
to interpret it after it is obtained.
Let me also say that I have become very humble
about my own ability to decide for others whether
to stop dialysis. I have found enormous variablity in
the individual feelings of each of my patients.
Throughout the legal imbroglio with Mr. Spring, I
talked with most of our patients about who should
decide to stop dialysis if they themselves could not
decide and what decision they would want made for
them. The responses have varied so much that I
doubt that anyone can decide for anyone else.
Many patients have expressed anger that anyone,
especially ajudge, would have the audacity to make
the decision for them. One patient said she would
want to stop dialysis if she became like Earle
Spring, but expressed concern that her husband
would not let her stop. Others said they never
would want to stop, but they wondered whether
their spouses would "pull the plug." Some ex-
pressed concern that a judge or doctor would have
the power to stop their life. Many expressed con-
cern that members of their family might not have
their own best interest in mind when it was time to
make the decision to stop the treatment. So my
patients' feelings cover the entire spectrum. In-
deed, most of them were very upset at the idea of
having a judge decide for them, but when asked
who should decide, these patients did not know.
Also, opinions about what they would want done
for them varied greatly. In general, the young
patients seemed cavalier about having dialysis dis-
continued and remarked that they would not like to
be alive under the same circumstances as Mr.
Spring. The older patients are not so sure. The
dilemma was best summarized by a few elderly but
very bright and alert patients, who said they could
not decide because they do not know what it is like
to be like Earle Spring. They also voiced concern
that if they did become demented, they no longer
would be able to express their feelings. How can
judges or anyone else substitute judgment for de-
mented patients without knowing what it's like to
be demented themselves? And, if no one can substi-
tute judgment accurately, is it reasonable to assume
that lawyers can do it better than doctors and
families who have been doing it for years?
DR. JEROME P. KASSIRER: Is there another coun-
try that handles these problems better than we?
DR. Fox: No, I don't think so. By that, I do not
mean to imply that we are doing so well with them,
but simply that at present we could be characterized
as the society that is the most consciously, overtly,
and extensively wrestling with such problems. To
my knowledge, there is no other place in the world
where the field of bioethics is as highly developed
as it now is in the United States. American society
seems not only to be feeling these problems more
keenly, but discussing them more frankly and per-
vasively, and searching in a more energetic and
organized fashion to find solutions to them.
Our involvement in these matters has a great deal
to do with some of the distinctive features of our
cultural tradition. In countries such as France and
Belgium, for example, there is far less of a cultural
propensity to discuss ethical and moral questions
openly and in everyday life than there is in the
United States. Europeans view Americans as very
peculiar in this regard. What is often referred to as
our "moralizing" is perplexing to Europeans, who
wonder whether our examinations of medical ethics
are authentic, admirable, idealistic, naïve, instru-
mental, manipulative, or cynical. In any case, the
kind of European reserve about "moralizing" is
part of a broader and deeper cultural reluctance to
examine values and beliefs. The reasons for this
reluctance would carry us beyond the focus of
today's discussion, but one contributing factor is
the association that Europeans historically have
made among values and beliefs, organized religion,
and the role of the Church (usually the Catholic
Church) in their political as well as personal lives.
In many European milieux, discussing values and
beliefs is tantamount to discussing religion. Such
discussions are considered not only regressive,
because they are viewed as part of a Church-
dominated era of authoritarianism and "obscuran-
tism," but they are regarded as potentially danger-
ous because of all the old religious and clerical
conflicts that such discussions might revive.
A certain scientism underlies the European atti-
tude too; a commitment to "being scientific," rath-
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er than religious or philosophic, and a positivistic
concept of what "real science" is tend to define
values, beliefs, and sentiments as inaccessible to
reason and to rational analysis. Not only bioethics
but also the social sciences in general are less
developed in Europe than they are in the United
States partly as a consequence of this cultural
outlook.
In sum, I believe that consciousness of the social
problems attending dialysis is not yet as high in
other societies as it is in the United States, that
these problems are far less likely to appear either in
the courts or in the news media, and that only to a
limited extent are the resources of moral philosophy
and social science being brought to bear on them.
DR. SHEAR: These problems have been kept
below the surface effectively in England because
relatively few uremic patients have been started on
dialysis. In the United States, we dialyze almost
anyone and then have to face the problem of
stopping the treatment.
DR. Fox: It seems to me highly unlikely, given
the nature of our value and belief system, that we
will develop a firm national policy forcing patients
with end-stage renal disease either to undergo home
dialysis or not receive dialysis therapy at all. We
already seem troubled about "de-selecting" anyone
for dialysis and about not giving everyone a wide
range of alternative treatment choices.
DR. JORDAN J. COHEN: If, as you suggest, the
social sciences are stronger in the United States
than elsewhere, can we look for some expert advice
from you and your colleagues about how to go
about making these decisions? It seems unlikely
that we will soon, if ever, return to the days when
the physician, the patient, and the family were
trusted to make tough decisions such as when to
withhold life-supporting treatment. Judging from
recent history, it seems even less likely that the
courts will provide us with a satisfactory solution;
neither the traditions nor the cumbersome structure
of the legal process holds much promise for the
courts being able to make timely and sensitive
decisions about individual cases. The physical and
biologic sciences are often asked to provide specific
solutions to problems within their respective do-
mains. Is it fair to ask social scientists to apply their
expertise to this dilemma?
DR. Fox: Two preliminary comments before I try
to answer your legitimate and important questions.
First, I must admit that social scientists did no
better than non-social scientists in predicting that
American medicine and American society in the
1960s, '70s, and '80s would be so deeply involved in
the questions we have been examining today. In
fact, the social science community might have been
deterred from making such predictions by our con-
cepts of the characteristics of an advanced society
like our own. Second, now that the issues currently
called "bioethics" have become so prominent and
pressing, the medical profession, courts, legisla-
tures, mass media, and the public have not turned
to social scientists for expert advice; philosophic
and theologic ethicists have been sought to provide
answers. In our society, the philosopher again has
become king.
The limited participation of sociologists in bioeth-
ics derives from at least three sources. First, for
various intellectual and ideologic reasons, the sci-
entific-based ethos of present-day American soci-
ology has tended to pull sociologists toward empiric
studies and theoretical analyses of social structure
and social organization, and away from more cul-
turally oriented studies of values, beliefs, symbols,
and rituals. Second, the emerging field of bioethics,
spearheaded by moral philosophers, has not enthu-
siastically welcomed social scientists. Largely be-
cause of the philosophic tradition of its leading
intellectual figures, the primary emphasis of bioeth-
ics has been on "individual rights" rather than on
social and cultural factors. Influential bioethicists
also have tended to look upon social science and its
practitioners as insufficiently humanistic. Many
physicians in the bioethics group, along with the
philosophers, theologians, jurists, and biologists.
tend to share this perspective. This brings me to the
third source: the nature of the relationship between
academic medicine and social science, not only
with respect to bioethics, but more generally.
In the course of my own 30 years of involvement
with academic medicine, physicians and social sci-
entists working in medical schools have made little
progress in collaborating on teaching, research, and
policy. We social scientists have been deficient in
our first-hand phenomenologic and intellectual
knowledge of medicine. In addition, when we have
taught what you call "behavioral science" in medi-
cal schools, we usually have not done it well, and
we have presented our materials in a wrong kind of
lecture form. Further, we have taught at the least
desirable time in the curriculum, namely, in the first
year, when for various reasons students are least
likely to be responsive to social science. Many
social scientists have approached the field of medi-
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cine with a blend of highly critical and reformist
attitudes, on the one hand, and attitudes of inferior-
ity and ressentiment on the other; neither approach
is conducive to collaboration.
On the other side, most physicians hold vague
and often erroneous ideas about what social science
is and have not made serious efforts to learn more
about it. Furthermore, it is not only European
physicians who engage in scientistic thought;
American physicians do too. Given some of their
rigid conceptions of science, and what Dr. Alvin
Feinstein of Yale University School of Medicine
has called their "cult of hard data," they have
tended to dismiss a great deal of social science work
as "just anecdotal." Perhaps the biggest problem of
all, however, has been the inclination of physicians
to parachute social scientists into medical schools,
expecting them to humanize the education of medi-
cal students by their sheer presence and by the few
introductory lectures that they are invited to give in
the first-year behavioral science course, and to
effectively and definitively solve some of the most
difficult problems with which the medical profes-
sion is faced. These expectations are misguided and
inherently unfulfillable. For this reason, I predict
that if academic physicians now have the same
expectations of moral philosophers, these doctors
eventually will experience the same disappoint-
ments that they earlier experienced with social
scientists.
Although it may not sound spectacular, I strongly
believe that the most enduring kind of help that
intellectual collaborators from other disciplines can
provide is to give you alternative ways of framing
these questions and of systematically and proba-
tively inquiring into them. Out of this process
should come some new perspectives, if not
solutions.
A PHILOSOPHY STUDENT: You seem to be equat-
ing the notions of collective and substituted judg-
ment. I think the role of the courts should be limited
to helping negotiate when there is uncertainty or
when the doctor, the patient, and the family are in
conflict. It is much better to use the medical model
instead of the legal model whenever possible—that
is to achieve "consent," literally a feeling together,
among the involved parties. In my view, the benev-
olent determinism that the law has to offer is not
superior to that which the physician can offer.
DR. Fox: 1 think you might have misunderstood
some of my statements about the sociologic per-
spective on individual and collective phenomena
and the relationship between them, about the role of
the courts in negotiating certain medical problems,
and about similarities and differences in medical
and legal logic and procedure. Let me try to be a
little clearer. As I see it, the conceptual frameworks
of medicine and law have some features in com-
mon. Both deal with individual cases. Both rely on
observation and testimony as well as texts. Both are
investigatory in nature. Both involve codified, sys-
tematic modes of thought and chains of reasoning
that are defined as logical and rational in Western
culture. Legal thought, however, is more adversary
in nature. And whereas probability reasoning plays
a basic and central role in medical thought, legal
authorities currently are debating its place and its
very legitimacy in the courts. Medical thinking
applies knowledge about large aggregates of indi-
viduals to particular individuals in ways that are
problematic for the law. In a recent publication, I
suggested that in cases like that of Chad Green and
his parents, the adequacy and ethicality of medical
probability reasoning when used in the courtroom
were as much "on trial" as were questions like the
rights of parents to refuse potentially life-sustaining
treatment for their children [7].
I want to make two principal points. The first is
that physicians and judges might be comparably
handicapped in dealing with some of the types of
problems that have beset dialysis because of the
limitations inherent in their particular forms of
logical and rational thought. The modes of thought
that now predominate in American philosophic eth-
ics and social science also might present conceptual
problems in this regard, as I have indicated. That
brings me to my second point. The issues before us
are not only difficult because of the anguishing
questions they evoke concerning what are the most
"right" and "good" things we can do about them.
Underlying these questions of conduct and action
are equally difficult paradigmatic questions: How
should we think about these matters? What is the
most relevant and fruitful kind of framework for
deliberating about such problems? Do we already
have a satisfactory framework that we can utilize? I
am not at all sure that we do. In any case, it seems
to me that the thought we bring to bear on these
questions cannot be exclusively medical, legal,
philosophic, or social scientific. Putting these disci-
plines all together, however, in an amorphous amal-
gam is not adequate either. There is no interdisci-
plinary magic.
DR. JOYCE ROOT (Department of Psychiatry,
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NEMCI-I): I am grateful to Dr. Fox for many of the
issues she has raised. We Americans traditionally
have viewed our society as being founded on the
concept of self-determination. We now face the
crisis of what to do for, and how to think about,
people who are not able to be self-determining and
self-reliant. Both psychiatry and medicine in gener-
al have been harshly criticized for not sufficiently
respecting the right of self-determination. But when
we choose nonintervention and suggest that pa-
tients formulate their own decisions, many of these
patients become helplessly dependent on their own
insufficient judgment or resources. We are at worst
abdicating our responsibility and at best turning our
backs on valid needs.
I particularly appreciated Dr. Fox's mention of
dialysis nurses because it seems to me that they are
the ones faced with these problems day after day.
They are constantly confronted with the patients'
problems of limited financial, social, and psycho-
logic resources. These nurses must deal with pa-
tients who are no longer self-reliant. Neither doc-
tors, nurses, nor anyone else in our society feels
prepared to confront the moral, economic, and
social problems of people who cannot care for
themselves. The nurses most of all experience the
stress created by our inability to address these
problems.
I think all of us here today believe that "the truth
shall make you free" even when the truths involve
painful psychologic dilemmas. We owe Dr. Fox
many thanks for expressing our dilemmas and label-
ing our predicament. She has been very comforting
about problems that are troubling because they call
into question what we understand to be the very
essence of our humanity.
DR. Fox: You are very generous to attribute to
me the fine analysis that you yourself just made. I
thoroughly agree with your comments on the way
that our society's emphasis on autonomy, self-
determination, and independent thought are con-
tributing to the "no man's land" irresolution that
you depict. Individualism, expressed in these var-
ious ways, always has been a basic value in our
society. But as you imply, since the 1960s aneo-
individualistic trend that emphasizes self-reliance
as well as individual rights is very much in evi-
dence. One manifestation of this self-reliance that is
especially relevant to health, illness, and medicine
is the emphasis on self-treatment that spans meth-
ods from jogging to health foods to home dialysis.
At the same time, the issue of human solidarity also
has been expressing itself in our society with new
prominence and urgency. In the medical sphere,
dialysis and transplantation have been strategic foci
of that kind of question. We seem to be having some
societal difficulty in reconciling and integrating our
individual and collective identities, rights, and re-
sponsibilities. But that, too, is an old American
problem. What is new is the fact that these cultural
tendencies have "spiked" since the 1960s and have
appeared in some different forms than in the past.
DR. KASSIRER: It is my impression that-the analy-
sis of these complex moral and ethical issues that
have remained hidden for years is merely a reflec-
tion of an increasing willingness in our society to
discuss anything and everything, a concept typified
by the vernacular, "Let it all hang out." Where is
this total candor leading us?
DR. Fox: I always have thought that one of the
most delicate things about the work of a social
scientist is that through our direct interaction with
the persons, groups, milieux, and situations that we
study, as well as through our writing, publishing,
lecturing, and teaching about them, we are contin-
ually making many latent aspects of social life
manifest. I consider that to be a special privilege
and a serious responsibility. Like you, Dr. Kas-
sirer, I do not take it for granted that tO "tell it like it
is," to ''tell it all," or to ''let it all hang out,'' is
necessarily a virtue. I hardly need to say this to a
group of physicians and nurses like you who appre-
ciate that there is both an art and an ethic involved
in how, when, where, and to what extent you tell
people about things that are "hidden" below the
conscious surface of either their own psyche or the
collective psyche of the group to which they belong..
You deal with this problem continually in your
relations with patients and their families.
I already have said enough about the long-stand-
ing tendency of Americans, as compared with other
peoples, to discuss openly the sorts of medical and
moral issues that we have been exploring. In that
sense, these discussions are not "leading us" any
place that we haven't been before. But I agree with
Dr. Kassirer's implication that we are doing more
talking about these things lately, on a broader, more
public scale, than we ever have before. I interpret
the open examination of basic ideas, concepts,
values, beliefs, and behaviors as a sign that a
considerable amount of social and cultural change is
in progress and that this change might prove signifi-
cant enough to modify our world view in basic
ways. We might have to develop new modes of
thought, as well as new institutional mechanisms, to
deal with what Dr. Kassirer has just termed "the
issues that have remained hidden for years."
DR. COHEN: Are any serious efforts being made
to provide a new mechanism?
DR. Fox: The effort is not systematically orga-
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nized, but I think one could say that there is a quasi-
experimental aspect to our attempts at dealing with
some of these questions in specially created bioeth-
ics institutes, national commissions, President's
commissions, ethics advisory committees, institu-
tional review boards, and science courts.
To return finally to the question, "Where is this
leading us?", I think that the most honest way to
end this conference is in a spirit of candid perplex-
ity. I certainly do not assume that as a social
scientist I have a better, clearer, or more authorita-
tively predictive answer to that question than you
do; as physicians and nurses, you are responsible
for the process of dialysis and all that it implies in
the 1980s.
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